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In early December, the U.S. President convened the heads of state of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace agreement. The commitment involved an end to decades of conflict in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations “to make a lot of money”.

Weeks later, however, a completely opposite method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites associated with the Islamic State (IS). On a online platform, the President stated, My prior warnings indicated these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Shift in Policy

These divergent actions exemplifies the defining feature of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and ending wars—despite the fact that this squares with the emerging military strikes in Nigeria remains to be seen.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A presidential representative echoed this, saying the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American investment, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Mixed Signals

This change is consequential, but experts caution it is too soon to assess its effects. The approach is intertwined with the President’s direct manner, which has included disputes with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said an analyst for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Notable policy moves have included:

• Dismantling the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. Research forecasts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a large number in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and halting most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has harmed African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to expire without renewal.

Diplomatic Apathy and Friction

In contrast to his recent predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His most infamous foray into African affairs was dubbing nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later confirmed using.

“Africa clearly runs dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for the President, but for the administration in general,” stated the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which gave only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A notable feud has erupted with South Africa, apparently influenced by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The narrative of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa aligns beautifully now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” observed a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Quid Pro Quo Relations and Targeted Involvement

A comparable standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation composed between Christians and Muslims and suffering from security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts suggested that the forceful rhetoric may have prompted the government into more responsiveness on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and sent an envoy to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, so far without success. While the Congo deal seems to have been broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” noted one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Competitors

Experts see the new U.S. approach as similar to that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have expanded their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” commented one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the revised strategy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The engagement that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a business-oriented posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.